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ARTICLES
CAVEAT VIATOR*: THE DUTY TO WEAR
SEAT BELTS UNDER COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE LAW
John A. Hoglund** and A. Peter Parsons***
The saga of highway carnage continues to unfold as we approach
the seventh decade of man's love affair with the horseless carriage.
One troubling detail of this tale of mobile independence is the relative
neglect for our own safety. Despite the increasingly sophisticated de-
vices provided in automobiles for self-preservation, voluntary utiliza-
tion of those devices remains discouragingly low. As a consequence,
the number of fatal and disabling injuries steadily mounts along with
the social and personal costs of such injuries.
Fortunately, the legal system has at last resolved that 19th century
concepts of negligence are unsatisfactory in balancing the burdens
incurred from automobile deaths and injuries. In rejecting the out-
moded "single-party fault system" for the assessment of responsibility,
the Washington Legislature has adopted a "pure" comparative negli-
gence formula which allows each of the parties involved in an acci-
dent to recover the amount of his damages from the other, reduced by
the percentage of his negligent contribution to the causation of the
accident.'
Implicit within this comparative equation is the principle that each
person should bear the responsibility for injuries due to his or her neg-
ligence. Perhaps less obvious but still encompassed by the equation is
the concept that every individual must bear the duty of taking
affirmative steps to prevent his own injury. Thus, the subject of seat
* "Let the traveler beware." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONOUNCI-
ATIONS 184 (1969).
** Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; associated with the law firm of Mooney,
Cullen & Holm, Olympia, Washington; B.A., Augustana College, 1967; J.D., George
Washington University, 1973.
*** Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; associated with the law firm of Perkins,
Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Seattle, Washington; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Puget Sound; B.S., Florida Atlantic University, 1969; J.D., Duke
University, 1973; Certified Public Accountant.
I. Ch. 138, [19731 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949, codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.22.010, .020, .900, .910 (Supp. 1973); see Note, Comparative Negligence, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 705, 709 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note].
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belts is of some consequence for both plaintiff and defendant under
the theory of comparative negligence. Courts and legislatures in recent
years have declined to impose seat belt use upon reluctant motorists,
due in part to residual doubt as to the effectiveness of the devices,
concern for the resulting infringement of personal liberties, and recog-
nition of the harsh inequities which would result from barring other-
wise deserving plaintiffs under theories of contributory negligence.
The first portion of this article will attempt to show that neither ju-
dicial nor legislative reluctance, nor its underlying reasoning, is justi-
fiable in light of the current state of law and society. Substantial evi-
dence will be presented to demonstrate the need for our society to
adopt the seat belt habit and for the law to recognize and respond to
this societal need. Reactions of courts and legislative bodies to sugges-
tions of mandated use are then explored as a preliminary to an anal-
ysis of the common law basis for adoption of the seat belt rule. A
careful explanation will then be presented regarding introduction and
application of the seat belt rule under Washington's comparative neg-
ligence law. Finally, it is hoped that the article will be of use to legis-
lators, judges and lawyers alike, not only in Washington, but in all ju-
risdictions contemplating changes in the law relating to the use and
misuse of our "insolent chariots. ' 2
I. THE CARNAGE AND THE SEAT BELT
The availability of occupant restraint systems for automobiles is a
comparatively recent phenomenon. 3 Although Washington does not
2. JOHN KEATS, THE INSOLENT CHARIOTS (1958).
3. The earliest expression of concern located by the authors, regarding the role
of vehicular restraint systems in highway safety, was the statement of Earl of
Andrews: "Quoth what fool darest upon the highways of this realm without properly
strapping his ass to his cart." Address before His Majesty's Order of Scribes, Hamfin
on Tyrne, Clarkshire, England, Oct. 4, 1683, reported in F. ACCAD, THE BARRISTER'S
TOME xvi (1814).
It was not until 1964 that most U.S. automobile manufacturers began installing
two lap belts in the front seats as standard equipment; and not until 1966 were four
lap belts placed in all new cars. By January 1968, standards issued by the National
Highway Safety Bureau (now the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration)
required that lap belts be installed for each seating position in the vehicle and that
upper torso restraints be installed for the front seating positions. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408,
2415 (1967). This rule, finally denominated as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1973) was promulgated under
authority of the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
(1970). In addition, seat belt warning devices are now required on vehicles manu-
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require the installation of seat belts in automobiles manufactured be-
fore January 1, 1964,4 the number of these vehicles in operation on
Washington highways is rapidly declining. The enactment of legisla-
tion requiring seat belt installation derives from recognition of the
ever increasing social and economic losses occasioned by automobile
accidents.5 While the traffic accident death rate per Washington ve-
hicle mile has gradually decreased, the total number of deaths remains
at a high level with the number of injury producing accidents on the
rise.6 Correlatively, the economic costs of automobile accidents have
reached near astronomical levels.7
There is a high probability that the average motorist will be in-
volved in at least one accident, resulting in death or injury to himself,
during his lifetime.8 Many drivers are under the erroneous assumption
that these fatal or injury producing accidents occur only at higher
factured after January 1, 1972 and before August 15, 1975. 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.208
S4.1.1, S4.1.2 (1973). FMVSS No. 208 was also extensively revised to cover multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses made after July 1, 197 1. Id. §§ S4.2, S4.3.
More recent revisions of FMVSS No. 208 reflect a movement toward a system of
passive restraints, i.e., restraints which automatically protect a vehicle occupant in a
crash without voluntary activation of the device. The revisions will become effective
onJan. 1, 1972, Aug. 15, 1973, andAug. 15, 1975. Id. §§ S4.1.1, S4.1.2, S4.1.3.
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 46.37.510 (1963).
5. Nationally, 48 % of the total accidental deaths and 18% of the total accidental
disabling injuries (injuries which prevent a person from performing usual activities
for a full day beyond the day of accident) occurring in 1972 resulted from motor
vehicle accidents. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 2-3 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as 1973 ACCIDENT FACTS]. The above percentages have remained rather
constant over the past 5 or 6 years. Death from motor vehicle accidents still ranks
as the leading cause of death from ages 1 to 25 years. Id. at 8.
6. Total number of automobile accident deaths in Washington for 1972 was 852,
for 1971 was 876, and for 1970 was 875. The total number of persons nonfatally
injured in accidents in 1972 was 55,454, in 1971 was 55,099, and in 1970 was 53,465--
for a cumulative increase of 3.07% over the 3-year period. WASHINGTON STATE
PATROL, WASHINGTON STATE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 37 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as WASH. ACCIDENT FACTS].
7. Of the total national estimate for all accidental injuries of $23.5 billion, 82.5%
or $19.4 billion of cost resulted from motor vehicle accidents. 1973 ACCIDENT FACTS
at 5. This total includes a $13.4 billion estimated cost of injuries (including wage losses
and medical expenses) and insurance administrative costs and an estimate of $6
billion for property damage. Other costs not included in this figure are those of certain
public agency activities such as police, fire and courts, damages awarded in excess of
direct costs, and indirect costs to employers. Id.
The economic losses incurred in 1972 in the State of Washington from automobile
accidents were estimated at $244,300,000. This amount represented a substantial
increase of $700,000 over the estimated losses for Washington during 1971. WASH.
ACCIDENT FACTS at 4.
8. Over 1,000 Americans are killed every week in traffic accidents; almost 10,000
are injured each day. The combined figure, computed on an annual basis, approxi-
mately equals the number of babies born in the United States yearly. These statistics
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speeds. Statistics indicate, however, that approximately 26 percent of
fatal accidents and 65 percent of injury producing accidents occur
under 40 miles per hour. 9
Use of seat belts will not only increase safety by reducing the se-
verity of "second collisions" an occupant might have with the interior
surfaces of a vehicle,' 0 but will also minimize accident-causing driver
discomfort and distractions." Despite these compelling realities the
general public prefers not to "buckle up."
At least one reason for this public sentiment seems to be a con-
tinuing doubt as to the effectiveness of safety belts.' 2 The public's
doubts are unwarranted, however. Numerous researchers conducting
field studies in recent years have unanimously concluded that use of
restraint systems, such as the lap belt and a single diagonal torso re-
straint, reduce vehicular accident injury and mortality.' 3 While the
lend credibility to the statement that "every American born from today forward may
be killed or injured in an automobile crash."
One's exposure to death by automobile collision is considerably higher than one's
exposure to death by involvement in warfare. From 1900 through 1972. motor
vehicle deaths totaled more than 1,900,000, whereas U.S. military casualties in
principal wars (including battle and other causes of death) from the Revolutionary
War (1775) through the Viet Nam War (1972) totaled approximately 1,155,000. 1973
ACCIDENT FACTS at 49.
9. Id. at 53. "Driving too fast" has been noted as a factor in only 15% of all
accidents. It tends to be a factor of greater importance in accidents occurring in rural,
as opposed to urban, areas. Id. at 48.
10. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION.
AUTOMOBILE SAFETY BELT FACT BOOK 3 (1972).
11. When in place, seat belts increase the driver's control of the vehicle and help
to prevent concurrent accidents; by keeping the driver in a comfortable position, they
can reduce fatigue and make driving safer; and by restraining children, they deter
the driver from becoming distracted from the pressures of driving. Id.
12. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
THE CASE FOR SEAT BELTS 9-13 (Jan. 1973). Other common rationalizations for
nonuse include: inconvenience, lack of necessity for short trips, possible failure in
the event of a serious crash, fear of being trapped in case of fire or submergence in
water, and possibility of injury (e.g., to pregnant women), caused by the belts.
Several courts have also stressed that there is still conflicting evidence on the value
of seat belts. See Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So.2d 666 (1970);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917-18 (Del. Super. 1967); D. W. Boutwell
Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So.2d II (Miss. 1971): Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J.
Super. 270, 275, 239 A.2d 273 (1967).
13. Bohlin, A Statistical Analysis of 28,000 Accident Cases with Emphasis on
Occupant Restraint Value, I1TH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE 299 (1967),
abstract reprinted in 12 TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW 29 (1968). Mr.
Bohlin found that use of Volvo's three-point harness reduced injuries between
40% and 90% depending on the accident speed and type of injury. He also observed
that "[n]on-belted occupants sustained fatal injuries throughout the whole speed
scale, whereas none of the belted occupants was fatally injured at accident speeds
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statistical calculations vary, common among these surveys is the con-
clusion that use of seat belts can reduce the possibility of serious in-
jury or death from 50 to 100 percent and that the possibility of any or
slight injury can be reduced from 30 to 40 percent. 14
Thus, while it is generally conceded that seat belts do not render
users free from harm,15 they do appear to significantly reduce users'
chances of suffering a fatal or disabling injury.16 Nevertheless,
below 60 mph." Id. See also J. K. Kihlberg, Efficacy of Seat Belts in Injury and
Noninjury Crashes in Rural Utah: Technical Report, May 1969 (Cornell Aero-
nautical Laboratory, Inc.) (data collected on 14,261 crash victims); A Study of
Seat Restraint Use and Effectiveness in Traffic Accidents, Jan. 1970 (Highway Safety
Foundation); D. N. Levine & B. J. Campbell, Effectiveness of Lap Seat Belts and the
Energy Absorbing Steering System in the Reduction of Injuries, Nov. 1971 (U. of N. C.
Highway Safety Research Center); Tourin & Garrett, Safety Belt Effectiveness in
Rural California Automobile Accidents, Feb. 1970 (Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory,
Inc.).
Another more recent study conducted in North Carolina indicated that use of seat
belts can reduce serious injuries on the average of 43%, and all injury on the average
of 36.5%. Levine & Campbell, The Energy-Absorbing Steering System In the Reduc-
tion oflInjuries, 4 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 106 (1972).
14. Kihlberg, supra note 13, at 2; Tourin & Garrett, supra note 13, at 6; Levine
& Campbell, supra note 13, at 108. The Washington State Patrol has found that only
one person using seat belts has died in an accident for every 13 nonusers that were
killed. Moreover, "for every three seat belt users who received a disabling injury in a
traffic accident, there were twenty two nonusers who received a disabling injury."
Washington State Patrol, 1972 Seatbelt Study at 1.
15. Washington State Patrol, 1971 Seatbelt Study at 2. The possibility of different,
though less serious, injuries produced by lap belts is fairly well documented. See
Schneider, Smith, Grabb, Turcotte & Huelke, Lap Seat Belt Injuries, The Treatment
of the Fortunate Survivor, 67 MICH. MEDICINE 171 (1968). Some courts have also
recognized that seat belts may cause or aggravate certain injuries. See Hampton v. State
Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236, 249 (1972); Romankewiz v. Black,
16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
160 S.E.2d 65 (1968). See also Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents,
Wis. L. REV. 288, 292 (1967).
Most cases describe a distinctive pattern of injury due to impingement of
the belt itself upon flexion of the upper body over the belt. Additionally, a single
diagonal shoulder belt may produce serious injuries if worn without a lap belt.
However, many of the hazards are reduced significantly when the seat belt
is properly installed and worn, and the trauma resulting from flexion of the
upper torso can be eliminated through use of a shoulder belt in combination
with a lap belt. See Snyder, The Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
211, 223-4 (1970). While seat belts may contribute to injury in specific cases, they
have never been shown to aggravate injury and have certainly prevented more
serious, albeit different injury. Id.; accord, Garrett & Braunstein, The Seat Belt
Syndrome, 2 J. TRAUMA 220 (1962); Porter & Green, Seat Belt Injuries, 96 ARCHIVES
OF SURGERY 242-46 (1968). Safety belts rarely cause intra-abdominal injury. Doersch
& Dozier, The Seat Belt Syndrome, 116 AMER. J. SURGERY 831, 831-33 (1968); Le
Mire, Earley & Hawley, Intra-abdominal Injuries Caused by Automobile Seat Belts,
201 J.A.M.A. 735, 735-37 (1967).
16. See notes 13-14 supra. In addition, a few of the more common fears of
wearing seat belts, i.e., being trapped in a burning or submerged vehicle or becoming
more seriously injured if pregnant (occasionally asserted as justification for denial of
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despite the millions of dollars that have been expended by federal
and state governments for educational campaigns, 17 and despite the
increased availability of safety belts, less than 30 percent of all
automobile occupants use seat belts. 18 It is submitted that the
legal system must respond to this lack of citizenry concern for self-
preservation and the resulting carnage.
mandatory use of safety belts, see Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n. 209 Kan.
565, 498 P.2d 236, 249 (1972)), have been specifically found to have little or no
statistical merit. 1971 Seatbelt Study, supra note 15, at I.
Generally, it has been found that less than 0.5 % of all injury-producing accidents
are followed by fire or submersion. Even in these cases, belted occupants are more
likely to have less serious injuries than unbelted occupants and be better able to cope
with the situation. See B.J. Campbell & K. Kihlberg, Automobile Fire in Connection
with an Accident. 1964 (Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.).
And, in the case of a pregnant female and her fetus, data indicate that the use of
the seat belt prevents more serious injury. Candler, A Safe Ride for Mother and
Child, WOMAN'S DAY, Sept. 1971, at 8; Crosby & Costiloe, The Effect of Lap Belt
Restraint on Pregnant Victims of Automobile Collisions, 14 ANN. CONF. AMER.
Ass'N AUTOMOTIVE MEDICINE 97 (1970); Snyder, supra note 15, at 224.
17. Efforts such as the "Buckle Up for Safety" campaign have been dismal
failures. In a recent study sponsored by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,
the seat belt usage rate of television viewers exposed to a series of six messages over
a 9-month period was compared to that of a control group whose members were
not exposed to the messages. At the end of the exposure period, the researchers
concluded that the campaign had had no effect whatsoever on safety belt use.
Robertson, et al., A Controlled Study of the Effect of Television Messages on Safety
Belt Use, June 1972 (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety).
Lack of material incentives, absence of positive reinforcement through the media
in supporting the esthetic ethic of wearing the belts and the psychological "denial" of
the personal impact of not wearing seat belts (which infers that most drivers "block
out" the high threat message of death or serious injury) have all been cited as critical
factors to overcome in solving the consumer acceptance problem of voluntary seat
belt usage. Interviews with Dr. Carl L. Klingberg. Research Supervisor, Div. of
Research & Technology, Wash. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, in Olympia. Nov. 1973-Jan.
1974. See also Wilson, Lonero & Ish, Increasing Seatbelt Use Through A Pro-
gram Presented In Elementary Schools, 16TH CONF. AMER. ASS'N AUTOMOTIVE MED-
ICINE 372 (1972).
18. Robertson, O'Neill & Wixom. Factors Associated With Observed Safety Belt
Use, 13 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (1972).
In a 1967 study based on 709 observations collected by four observers in North
Carolina, seat belt utilization was reported at 32%. B. J. Campbell, P. F. Waller &
F. NI. Council, Seat Belts: A Pilot Study of Their Use Under Normal Driving
Conditions, Nov. 1967 (U. of N.C. Highway Safety Research Center). A follow-up
study in 1969 produced a similar report of 35.8% utilization. F. M. Council, Seat
Belts: A Follow-Up Study of Their Use Under Normal Driving Conditions, Sept. 1969
(U. of N.C. Highway Safety Research Center).
The Washington State Patrol reports that the seat belt usage rate of automobile
occupants involved in investigated accidents was a mere 25% during 1972. and that
this percentage has shown a diminutive increase over recent years. 1972 Seatbelt Study
at 1.
Some courts have cited the low usage level as a reason for not imposing mandatory
seat belt usage. Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606. 609
(1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1968).
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II. THE LAW AND THE SEAT BELT
The legal system's response to this conundrum of societal loss and
citizen indifference has been woefully inadequate. 19 Although the
federal government has been moving in the direction of requiring the
installation of passive restraint systems in automobiles after 1975,20
this development clearly will not supersede the need for seat belts.21
Indeed, Congress has made a firm policy commitment to mandatory seat
belt use and has seen fit to encourage state passage of such laws by
way of incentive grants under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973.22
19. Only 34 states and the District of Columbia have passed laws requiring seat
belt installation in passenger cars. As of January 1, 1972, these 34 jurisdictions were:
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. One additional state, Kentucky, requires
anchorage units for seat belts in the front seat. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 1 LAWS REQUIRING SEAT BELTS 3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEAT BELT LAWs]. The descriptions of the vehicles covered vary
substantially from state to state, see id. at 37-9 nn.18-38, and only five jurisdictions,
California, Nevada, New York, Virginia and the District of Columbia, require belts
to be installed in all passenger seating positions. Id. at 9. Washington requires seat
belts to be installed only in the front seats. See note 4 supra.
20. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
21. Even if the automobile industry is successful in developing the air bag as
standard equipment, seat belts should still be worn to prevent either overshooting or
submarining the bag. Belts offer protection against injuries from side impacts and
roll-overs, where air bags would be ineffective. Belts also offer protection against
air bag failure and at deceleration levels below that at which the air bag is inflated.
See Bowman, Practical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyer's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
191, 195 (1970). Moreover, from a practical standpoint seat belts will be the only
safety restraint system available to most passengers for some years to come. See
SEAT BELT LAWS at 210.
22. Congress voted to support state-level, mandatory belt-use legislation when it
passed the Highway Safety Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C.A. § 4020) (Supp. 1974) (originally
enacted as Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, § 219, 87 Stat. 250). The law allows
the Department of Transportation to increase a state's highway safety funds by 25%
of its Highway-Aid apportionment if the state has a mandatory seat belt use law.
Section 4020) (2) also provides additional incentive grants, up to 25% of a state's
apportionment, to those states making the most significant progress in reducing traffic
fatality rates. The State of Washington will receive approximately $3 million in safety
funds under this Act for fiscal 1974. Were a mandatory seat belt usage law passed in
this regular session, the State would receive approximately $750,000 in additional
monies to promote already existing safety programs under the Act. Interview with
Finance Office, Accounting Div. of Management Servs., Wash. State Dep't of Highways,
in Olympia, Washington, Jan. 30, 1973.
Of perhaps greater import to the theme of this article are the statements of Congress
relating to national highway safety policy. See H.R. REP. No. 118, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
It should also be noted that a mandatory seat belt use law has been considered by
the Washington State Legislature. State Senator Joseph Stortini (D-Tacoma) introduced
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The judiciary, however, has hesitated to require the citizenry to
protect themselves by use of seat belts for fear that such impositions
may not only infringe upon "constitutional rights and personal priv-
ileges" of motor vehicle occupants, but also unfairly preclude or dim-
inish the right of recovery in negligence actions.23 This latter concern
has been the subject of much of the legal commentary concerning the
contributory negligence problems that may arise from the nonuse of
seat belts. 24
A. The Seat Belt Rule: Theory
1. The seat belt defense and contributory negligence
The mandatory installation of seat belts has inevitably led defense
counsel to assert in their client's behalf the so-called "seat belt rule":
That if the plaintiff had worn his seat belt, then his injuries would
have been reduced. 25 In view of recent statistical data, this inference is
more often than not justified in fact. 26
the first Washington mandatory seat belt use bill, S. 3154, 43d Legis., 3d Ex. Sess.
(1974). The measure died in the Senate Rules Committee after passing out of the
Senate Transportation and Utilities Committee. The bill provided, inter alia, for
mandatory belt use by persons operating vehicles or riding in the front seat. with
certain exceptions.
It is suggested that such a law should not unduly penalize violators with onerous
fines, if its object is to encourage greater belt usage by the motoring public. Hopefully,
the legislation will not bar introduction of seat belt nonuse evidence in negligence
actions; rather, it should allow the flexible consideration of such evidence by the
courts to appropriately reduce damages. Interviews with State Sen. Joseph Stortini,
in Olympia, Washington, Jan.-Feb. 1974.
23. See, e.g., Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969);
Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 2d 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Lipscomb v. Diamiani,
226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967).
This response may be understandable in view of the harsh result obtained if nonuse
of safety belts is considered contributory negligence, thus totally barring recovery by
an otherwise deserving plaintiff. Five jurisdictions which operate under contributory
negligence theory have adopted provisions to assure that any failure to use available
seat belts will have no effect upon the question of negligence. Three states provide
that evidence of a failure to use seat belts is not admissible in a law suit brought to
recover damages resulting from a collision. SEAT BELT LAWS, supra note 19, at 22-3
nn.120-22; see Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Marks, Does the Failure to Wear Seat Belts Constitute Contributory
Negligence? 1968 INSUR. L. J. 5; Note, Contributory Negligence For Failure to Use
a Seat Belt, 47 ORE. L. REV. 204 (1968); Note, Failure to Use Seat Belts As A Basis
For Establishing Contributory Negligence, Barring Recovery For Personal Injuries,
I U.S.F.L. REV. 277 (1967); Note, Failure To Wear Seat Belts As Contributory
Negligence: The Development of the Wisconsin Rule, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 662 (1967).
25. During the past decade, numerous actions have been brought in which the
seat belt defense has been interposed by defendants as an affirmative defense to bar
recovery or, at the least, to diminish the amount of recoverable damages. See
Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 172 (1970).
Duty to Wear Seat Belts
The two legal theories under which most proponents would sub-
sume the seat belt rule are the doctrines of contributory negligence
and avoidable consequences.27However, the assertion that nonuse of
seat belts is contributory negligence per se has been uniformly rejected
by the courts.28 Judicial reticence to adopt the seat belt rule is under-
standable, since the allowance of such a defense would bar any re-
covery by the plaintiff. No court has been willing to go so far as to
ignore the negligence of the defendant, and deny all recovery merely
because the plaintiff failed to "buckle up."'29 Defendants asserting the
See also Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 167 n.2, 492 P.2d 1030, 1034
n.2 (1970); Appendix A & Appendix B, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 226, 226-28 (1970).
The authors choose to use the phrase "seat belt rule" as distinguished from "seat
belt defense." The term "defense" has the connotation of a total legal bar to the
claims of an adversary party. As will be demonstrated, the seat belt rule only operates
to reduce a claimant's recovery attributable to his nonuse of seat belts. See section
III-E infra.
26. See notes 2-22 and accompanying text supra.
27. The Washington Supreme Court has recently considered the role of the
"seat belt defense" in Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030
(1972). In a 1968 traffic accident, when contributory negligence was still the law
in Washington, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries, including an injured knee.
The defendant had amended his answer raising the issue of contributory negligence
due to the lack of seat belt usage, and offered expert testimony to the effect that the
knee would not have been damaged had the plaintiff worn his seat belt. The court,
speaking through Justice Hunter, noted:
[W] hile states with comparative negligence do not have the problem to the same
extent, contributory negligence in many states (such as Washington) is a complete
bar to any recovery by a plaintiff-an obvious unjust result to apply in seat belt
cases.
Id. at 168, 492 P.2d at 1035. Justice Hunter recognized that the doctrine of avoidable
consequences had been suggested to fit this "conceptual dilemma," but refused to
expand the doctrine to encompass a standard of care before an accident. In consider-
ing the damage apportionment approach used in other states to reduce a plaintiff's
damages for failure to take reasonable precautions before the accident, Justice
Hunter stated that "the admission of evidence on the [mitigation of damages] ... is-
sue is tantamount to adopting the rule of comparative negligence." Id. at 171-72, 492
P.2d at 1037. Thus, in Derheim, the Washington court denied the existence of the
seat belt rule under the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoidable conse-
quences.
It is apparent, however, that the court in Derheim rejected the seat belt rule only as
a complete defense under the standard of contributory negligence. In Kjellman v.
Richards, 82 Wn. 2d 766, 770, 514 P.2d 134, 136 (1973), the court refused to reverse
a jury instruction given by the superior court which had couched the seat belt rule
in terms of a diminution of damages recoverable by the plaintiff if injuries were
proven attributable to the nonuse of seat belts.
28. See, e.g., Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Noth v.
Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); Moore v. Fischer, 31 Colo. App. 425,
505 P.2d 383 (1972); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 2d 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967);
Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Bertsch v.
Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194 (1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.
2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
29. But cf. Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
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doctrine of avoidable consequences have also been summarily re-
buffed, as that doctrine is in theory addressed to the duty to mitigate
one's damages after the accident's occurrence.30
Both the contributory negligence and avoidable consequences doc-
trines are judicially created.31 Yet many courts, engaging in classic
examples of "pigeonhole jurisprudence," have declined to fill the void
left by the two concepts by inferring a duty to avoid the consequences
of an accident before its occurrence without completely barring re-
covery for contributory negligence. 32
However, tacit recognition of the inequities involved in the rejec-
tion of the seat belt rule has led many jurisdictions to adopt a damage
apportionment technique. Apportionment of damages is, in effect, the
judicial merger of the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoid-
able consequences whereby evidence of the nonuse of seat belts by the
plaintiff will not be considered as contributory negligence, but may be
considered to diminish a damage recovery.33 The growing number of
states utilizing this approach have explicitly adopted a rule of compar-
ative negligence by reducing the amount of damage recovery to the ex-
tent that the plaintiff's injuries have been aggravated by plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt.
Judicial agonizing over the seat belt rule and its role under a stan-
dard of contributory negligence may be alleviated to some degree by
use of a two step analysis. The majority of the courts which have re-
30. See, e.g., Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
31. The late Dean Prosser suggested that the two doctrines are in reality the same.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 424 (4th ed. 1971).
32. See, e.g., Libscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967), Brown
v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App.
119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968);
Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
33. See quoted language from Derheim, note 27 supra. The number of American
jurisdictions that allow diminution of damages because of a party's failure to fasten
an available seat belt is growing. See Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344
(7th Cir. 1971) (applying Indiana law); Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D.
Miss. 1970); Noth v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); Truman v. Vargas,
275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Uresky v. Fedora, 27 Conn. Supp.
498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Josel v. Rossi, 7 II1. App. 3d 1091, 288 N.E.2d 677 (1972);
Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 2d 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967): Miller v. Haynes, 454
S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966);
Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968); Bentzler v. Braun,
34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). See also Yuan v. Farsted. [1968] 66 D.L.R.
2d 295 (1967). But cf. MacDonnell v. Kaiser. [1968] 68 D.L.R.2d 104 (1968). It
is, however, difficult to discern with exactitude the number of jurisdictions which will
allow diminution, as in many cases there has been no offer of proof as to the
damages traceable to seat belt nonusage.
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jected a finding of contributory negligence per se have noted that the
plaintiff was not the party that initiated the chain of causation re-
sulting in injury. 34 Those courts suggest that by analyzing the actions
of the initiating tortfeasor and the injured party together, judges do
violence to traditional tort concepts. 35 Bifurcation of the analysis,
however, into the respective roles of (1) the active negligence which
began the chain of causation, and (2) the passive negligence of the
injured party, makes it possible to separate an accident into two sever-
able occurrences. Thus, without modifying the rule of contributory
negligence, the separation of the respective acts or omissions of each
party allows a court to assess the initiating, active tortfeasor for dam-
ages owing to the causation of the accident, and offset the recovery of
the passively negligent injured party by the degree of damages prox-
imately caused by his failure to take reasonable safety precautions. 36
2. Judicial imposition of the duty to wear seat belts
An obvious prerequisite to the reduction of damages due to nonuse
of seat belts is the imposition of a duty to wear such equipment. The
passage of seat belt installation legislation should indicate a legis-
lative intent that such installed equipment actually be used.37 The
majority of courts, however, have not shared this perspective, and
have expressed the view that a duty to wear must await legislative
creation.38 Some courts, however, have utilized the elusive common law
34. See cases cited note 32 supra.
35. Id.
36. See C. R. HEFT & C. J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §
1.240 (1971). Washington generally recognizes the active/passive distinction. See, e.g.,
Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn. 2d 240, 280 P.2d 253 (1955). See also section III-E infra,
for examples of how this process will operate in particular fact situations.
37. If the English cases are any indication of judicial trends, the position that
there is no legislative intent to create a duty to wear safety belts grows increasingly
tenuous. The Highway Code (a nonstatutory motoring guide) declared that it was
prudent to wear seat belts while traveling in an automobile. From this general
indication of national policy, English courts have interpreted a duty to wear seat
belts. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra. Thus, a plaintiff's damages may
be reduced if he has disregarded this policy. See Kerse, Some Recent Decisions on
Wearing Seat Belts, 117 SOLICITORS' J. 625 (1973).
It may be argued that the Highway Safety Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C.A. § 4020)
(Supp. 1974) has conclusively established a national policy encouraging seat belt
utilization. Therefore, the legislative intent found wanting by some courts arguably
has been established in the federal legislation. See note 22 supra.
38. See Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969);
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore.
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"reasonably prudent person" standard to support a conclusion that the
plaintiff is under a duty of care to make use of seat belts. 39 In Bentzler
v. Braun, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reasoned:40
[A] s a matter of common knowledge, an occupant of an automobile
either knows or should know of the additional safety factor produced
by the use of seat belts. A person riding in a vehicle driven by another
is under the duty of exercising such care as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under similar circumstances to avoid injury to
himself.
A similar duty has been created by the English courts.4' In a motor-
cycle-car collision case, O'Connell v. Jackson,42 the defendant
claimed that the damages levied against him at trial should have been
diminished in proportion to the degree that the plaintiffs injuries were
caused by his failure to wear a safety helmet. In holding for the de-
fendant, the court stated that a reasonably prudent cyclist would wear
a helmet, and, therefore, the plaintiff "should bear part of the respon-
sibility for the severe consequences of the accident." 43 In propounding
a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect oneself, the O'Con-
nell court relied heavily upon the case of Jones v. Livox Quarries
Ltd.,44 in which Lord Justice Denning succinctly summarized this
facet of the reasonably prudent person standard:45
Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to
others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm
52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030
(1972).
39. See Mortonsen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 241, 53 Cal. Rptr.
851 (1966) (action for damages under Federal Employer's Liability Act): Mount v.
McClellan, 91 Il1. App. 2d 1, 234 N.W.2d 329 (1968); Bentzler v. Braun. 34 Wis.
2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
40. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967).
41. The English decisions in this area should be highly persuasive in the development
of an American standard not only for their lucid development of a purely common law
approach, but also because seat belt installation legislation in that country has
paralleled our own. Thus, the seat belt rule has been adopted without a legislative
imposition of the duty to wear seat belts. See the evolution of this development in
Davies v. Swan Motor Co., [1949] 2 K.B. 291 (C.A.); Jones v. Livox Quarries.
[1952] 2 Q.B. 608 (C.A.); O'Connell v. Jackson [1972] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A. 1971);
Pasternack v. Poulton, [ 1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.), noted in Kerse. supra note 37.
42. [1972] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A. 1971), noted in 35 MOD. L. REV. 525 (1972) & 116
SOLICITORS' J. 440 (1972).
43. [1972] IQ.B. at277(C.A. 1971).
44. [1952] 2Q.B. 608 (C.A.).
45. Id. at 615. See also Davies v. Swan Motor Co., [1949] 2 K.B. 291 (C.A.).
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to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought
reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable,
prudent man, he might be hurt himself; and in his reckonings he must
take into account the possibility of others being careless.
The rationale of the O'Connell case has subsequently been extended
to the use of seat belts.46
The reasonably prudent person standard is unquestionably the
proper approach to the seat belt rule. The standard is flexible and can
evolve with the times.47 In recent years, our mythical prudent person
has been barraged by media advertisements, safety lectures and high-
way signs all designed to remind the motoring public of the desirability
of "buckling up." There no longer exists a shield of ignorance which
a party may raise to defeat the standard of care owed to himself. The
reasonably prudent person has gained an education from which he cannot
retreat.48
B. Adoption of the Seat Belt Rule: Analysis
1. Contributory negligence jurisdictions
There remain, however, practical difficulties which may bar the ap-
plication of this standard in many jurisdictions. The Wisconsin and
46. See Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.); Kerse, Some Recent
Decisions on Wearing Seat Belts, 117 SOLICITORS' J. 625 (1973).
47. See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 149-51 (4th ed. 1971). The effect
of current standards of contemporary behavior upon the judicial concept of a reasonably
prudent person is illustrated in the concurring opinion of Justice Neill in Derheim
v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wn. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972): "I agree with the affirmance
on the basis that a failure by plaintiff to wear a seatbelt would not, in the present
state of things, amount to a breach of his duty to exercise reasonable care in his own
behalf." Id. at 172, 492 P.2d at 1037. (emphasis added). The accident in Derheim
occurred in June 1968.
48. The fact that a claimant may not ignore the standard of the reasonably
prudent person was aptly characterized by the court in Purnell v. Shields, unreported
decision noted Kerse, Some Recent Decisions on Wearing Seat Belts, in 117
SoLIciTORs'J. 625, 626 (1973) (emphasis added):
I do not think that a driver in the position of this man had to anticipate folly
in every form in which it manifests itself. But I do not think he was entitled to
reject, as he must have rejected, all the teachings that have been given in recent
years about the desirability of wearing seat belts.
The dangers of the highway and the concomitant duty to care for oneself were
recognized in Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn. 2d 564, 573 n.5, 354 P.2d 696, 701 n.4 (1960):
"The rule that a motorist has a right to assume that other users of the highway will
not drive negligently.., applies only in favor of those whose conduct measures up
to the standard of due care." (Emphasis added).
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English authorities experienced little difficulty in establishing a duty
of care to oneself, since both jurisdictions have operated under a
standard of comparative negligence for decades.49 Jurisdictions
which have not yet adopted the comparative negligence standard have
only three choices: (1) allow the seat belt rule as contributory
negligence and bar all recovery; (2) deny the seat belt rule and,
thereby, require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for self-
aggravated injuries; or (3) adopt the damage apportionment technique
to achieve, in essence, the same damage distribution as occurs in
some comparative negligence jurisdictions.5 0 The inequities in ap-
proaches (1) and (2) are self-evident. The first defeats the public
policy favoring the just compensation of accident victims. The sec-
ond unfairly burdens defendants with the costs of the plaintiffs own
self-neglect and undermines the public interest in safety equipment
utilization. The third choice, however, essentially involves only a
judicial modification of the judicially created doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence in order to achieve an equitable result.
2. Comparative negligence jurisdictions
Jurisdictions employing the standard of comparative negligence
need not engage in any flights of intellectual fantasy to use the seat
belt rule as a mechanism to assure the proper apportionment of
damage recoveries. By its very nature, the concept of comparative
negligence contemplates the inclusion of all relevant factors in ar-
riving at the appropriate amount of damages to be recovered by each
of the claimants. 51 It must be concluded, therefore, that the advent of
the comparative negligence standard, when coupled with the refined
version of the reasonably prudent person standard, will ineluctably
49. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act of 1945, c. 28.
50. See cases cited note 33 supra. The Washington court in Derheim dealt with
this problem. See note 27 supra.
51. See C. R. Heft & C. J. Heft, note 36 supra. This more complex and equitable
apportionment was recently summarized by Justice Finley in Lyons v. Redding
Construction Co., 83 Wn. 2d 86, 96, 515 P.2d 821, 826 (1973): "Adoption of the
standard of comparative negligence is necessarily accompanied by a more fllexible
weighing of the relative fault attributable to each party." In Lyons, the court recognized
that the more complex weighing of factors under a standard of comparative negligence
obviates the need for the operation of the doctrine of assumption of risk and the
maxim volenti non fit injuria.
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lead to the adoption of the seat belt rule as a significant element of the
damage apportionment equation. 52
As the Washington comparative negligence statute is of the "pure"
type, the seat belt rule, when adopted, may take an unusual but desir-
able twist. Unlike the Wisconsin version 53 of the comparative negli-
gence concept which bars recovery in cases where the claimant is more
than 50 percent at fault, the Washington "pure" comparative negligence
statute permits damage recovery irrespective of the claimant's degree of
fault.54 Hence, each party in an automobile accident, whether plaintiff
or defendant, is potentially subject to the seat belt rule.55 The
failure of either the plaintiff or the defendant to take the reasonably
prudent precaution of "buckling up" may operate to reduce his re-
spective damages. 56
52. Adoption of the seat belt rule could have a dramatic effect upon the level of
usage in Washington by informing the motoring public that they can look only to
themselves for compensation for self-aggravated injuries.
Moreover, despite public reluctance to use seat belts, a 1973 survey conducted by
the Washington Traffic Safety Commission indicated that 58% of those responding
favored a compulsory seat belt use law. Washington Traffic Safety Comm'n, Seat Belt
Survey 1, 17-27, Sept. 1973 (unpublished report for Governor's Highway Safety
Representatives & Coordinators, filed at WTSC offices, Olympia, Wash.). However, a
1972 survey by the Automobile Club of Washington indicated that although 62%
of its members always used their belts, only 40% would favor a mandatory seat
belt use law. Seattle Times, Nov. 23, 1972, § G, at 24, col. 1.
At least two foreign jurisdictions have enacted mandatory seat belt use laws. New
Zealand passed its seat belt use law in 1971. Transport Amend. No. 2, § 7 (N.Z.
Nov. 27, 1971). The more interesting experience has been in Australia, where
all states have adopted mandatory seat belt use statutes. SEAT BELT LAWS, supra
note 19, at 16. The experience in the State of Victoria, the first state to do so,
Victoria Motor Car (Safety) Act of 1970 (No. 8074), supports the contention that
many individuals voluntarily comply with the mandate, despite the presumed diffi-
culty of enforcement. In a recent study in Victoria it was found that 76% of drivers
and passengers wore seat belts when they were available. In addition, despite public
resistance in Australia prior to the time the law became nationwide, 76% of drivers
interviewed before enactment expressed their agreement with the new compulsory
wearing laws. See Ontario Ministry of Transportation & Communications, Austra-
lian Safety Researcher Here, 16 ONTARIO TRAFFIC SAFETY 1, 2 (1973).
See also SEAT BELT LAws, supra note 19, at 16-21.
53. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
54. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.010, .020, .900, .910 (Supp. 1973); see Note,
supra note 1, at 705-6, 709.
55. See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra & 83-85 infra.
56. The seat belt rule may also spur the creation of a criterion which could be
utilized by insurance carriers to offer lower rates on automobile personal injury
coverage. If the insured party has suffered injuries due to the nonuse of safety belts,
his damages, of course, will be reduced by an appropriate amount. The claimant,
if covered by automobile personal injury insurance, may then make a claim against
his insurance carrier. The insurance carrier would be liable for the balance of the
injuries not compensated by the liability insurance of the adverse party.
An enterprising carrier might capitalize upon the seat belt rule by offering a
reduction in premium. Personal injury coverage could be made contingent upon the
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3. Infringement on personal liberties by use of the seat belt rule
To justify the imposition of a seat belt rule, society must be bene-
fited. Conversely, the duty to wear a seat belt must not be designed
merely to protect the individual from his folly, 57 because imposition of
such a duty may unjustifiably or unconstitutionally impinge upon the
individual's freedom of choice. 5
8
In this respect the theories supporting the constitutionality of the
mandatory helmet laws for motorcycles are most instructive. 59 The
traditional justification for legislation of this nature has been the
public welfare theory. 60 The imposition of mandatory helmet and seat
belt laws is said to protect society, as their nonuse may result in in-
juries whose costs far exceed the resources of the individual and there-
fore must be borne by the state. To protect the government fisc, the
state must impose upon the individual a duty to protect himself.61
The inherent desirability of the seat belt as a device to assure
that the driver maintains control of his vehicle is a more attractive
justification for a legislative or judicial rule mandating seat belt
insured's use of available passenger restraint systems. Hence, personal injury coverage
would be denied to the insured who was found not to be wearing a seat belt at the
time of an accident. Another approach to personal injury coverage under the seat
belt rule would encompass a scheduling of coverage wherein the insurer's liability
for personal injury coverage would be reduced by a scheduled percentage when its
insured did not utilize available vehicle restraint systems. By way of illustrative
example, personal injury benefits might be reduced 50% for failure to wear a lap
belt, and an additional 20% for neglecting to wear the shoulder belt. (More accurate
percentages might be determined by statistics dealing with the injury-reducing
characteristics of the lap and shoulder belts.) The incremental savings and claims
attributable to such a clause could be actuarily translated into a lower premium for
this type of coverage. Thus, a policyholder could realize a lower premium by
agreeing to utilize a seat belt at all times.
CAVEAT: The policy must explicitly and unequivocally state the condition of
seat belt use as a prerequisite to personal injury coverage. See Dairyland Insurance
Co. v. Ward, 83 Wn. 2d 353, 517 P.2d 966 (1974).
57. This contention has its origin in the utilitarian philosophy of John Stewart
Mill. Mill persuasively posits that man surrenders to the social compact only the
powers necessary for his governance. Hence, those powers not essential to the
functioning of the state reside in its people. See generally J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 131-49 (1949).
58. See Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective
Legislation, 30 OHIO L.J. 355, 361 (1969), where the author suggests that in order
to be constitutional, legislation interfering with a motorcyclist's decision on whether
to wear a helmet must be supported by some ascertainable public need.
59. Id.
60. W. Ames, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation
11-12, Dec. 1972 (unpublished report prepared by the Virginia Highway Research
Council).
61. Id.
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use. Racing drivers since Barney Oldfield have recognized the value
of seat belts and racing harnesses to hold them behind the wheel in
violent maneuvers.6 2 Indeed, the lack of seat belt usage may actually
cause accidents; far more easily than the experienced racing driver,
the average motor vehicle operator may lose control by being thrown
from the wheel by a spin, violent evasive action or sudden braking. A
similar loss of control may be precipitated by the sliding or unseating
of a vehicle passenger flung by inertial or centrifugal forces against
the operator. The innocent motorist requires and deserves protection
from the spectre of an oncoming, careening automobile whose driver
has been jostled from its controls. 63
The first step in providing such protection has produced laws re-
quiring installation of seat belts. The next step requires the judicial or
legislative adoption of the seat belt rule as both reasonable and neces-
sary for public safety.64 The advent of the rule will facilitate a more
equitable apportionment of damages between the respective parties in
direct proportion to their relative degree of fault. The rule will also
assure that proof of nonuse of seat belts, coupled with proof of med-
ical causation between the nonuse and the party's injuries, will result
in a proportionate reduction of the amount of a party's recoverable
damages.65 Thus, in Washington the new comparative negligence
standard coupled with the seat belt rule will improve the equities of
personal injury law.
62. Id. at I. See also Choosing a Small Car: The Safety Question, 39 CONSUMER
REPORTS 294, 296 (1974).
63. The number of accidents precipitated by the lack of seat belt usage is difficult,
if not impossible, to establish. See notes 13 & 14 and accompaning text supra; cf.
Quinuis v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969). The legislature, or
the courts, need not, however, conclusively document its concerns but may proceed
upon certain "unprovable assumptions." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
62 (1973). Such legislation satisfies the requirements of due process, and is, therefore,
a valid exercise of the police power.
64. Five states have enacted laws requiring the use of seat belts by occupants of
certain types of vehicles, generally applicable to the drivers of school buses. California
provides for mandatory use by the driver or passenger in driver training vehicles.
Massachusetts, Minnesota and New York mandate seat belt use by school bus drivers.
Rhode Island requires the drivers of buses (including school buses), trolleys or
authorized emergency vehicles, to use seat belts. SEAT BELT LAWS, supra note 19, at
15-16.
The only jurisdiction in the United States to adopt a general mandatory seat belt
use law is the city of Brooklyn, Ohio. The first violation is punishable by an oral
reprimand. Second and third violations within a year carry maximum fines of $2.00
and $5.00 respectively. Id. at 16 n.106.
65. See section III-E infra.
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III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND THE DUTY TO
WEAR SEAT BELTS
Having established that the use of seat belts will substantially re-
duce the number and severity of automobile accidents, and that the
courts of Washington might reasonably hold that in the absence of
specific legislation the duty to wear seat belts exists under the new
comparative negligence statute, it seems appropriate to postulate the
application of the seat belt rule within the context of civil proceedings.
It has been suggested that the preferred basis for apportionment of
damages under a comparative negligence statute is the relative degree
of fault, rather than causation.66The most commonly discussed means
for arriving at this determination is by the use of a special verdict
form or interrogatories for the jury,67 although it should also be noted
that in some comparative negligence jurisdictions the court determines
the causation percentages and apportions the damages accordingly.6 8
A. A Three Step Procedure
It should be recognized that the proposed seat belt rule is a
"double-edged sword" equally invokable by plaintiff or defendant to
reduce the recoverable damages by the other. In practical application,
it is suggested that after each party to a personal injury action proves
the amount of damages actually suffered, the seat belt rule be applied
in a three step procedure:
66. Note, supra note 1, at 712-13.
67. Id. at 713-14. Prosser has suggested a simple, yet complete, series of queries
and responses for the jury to utilize under such a special verdict procedure. See
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REV. 465, 497-98 (1953), cited in
Note, supra note 1, at 713-14 n.45. See also the Wisconsin example of special verdict
form submitted by Kenneth P. Grubb of the Milwaukee Bar in Grubb & Roper,
Comparative Negligence, 32 NEB. L. REV. 234, 242-43 (1952), set forth in Henry.
Why Not Comparative Negligence in Washington?, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 1, 13 (1969).
Mr. Grubb indicates that the jury does not in such cases assess the damage to the
parties, but rather the court after receiving the verdict, independently determines the
final monetary judgment in accordance with the figures supplied by the jury. Grubb
& Roper, supra, at 244. It is suggested that this is the proper proceduie for Washington
to follow.
It is also observed that the comparative rule of loss has for hundreds of years been
recognized as the doctrine of division of loss in Admiralty. Thus, it has been
suggested that the type of interrogatories submitted to the jury in maritime cases
might be appropriate under our comparative negligence law. Henry, supra, at 8-11.
68. See, e.g., Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.): O'Connell v.
Jackson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A. 1971).
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(1) (a) The jury is initially instructed to answer the queries of a spe-
cial verdict, designed to determine, on a percentage basis, the relative
contribution of each party to the causation of the accident. This deter-
nination may be termed the "accident causation percentage."
(b) The jury is then instructed to answer the queries of a spec-
ial verdict designed to determine the degree of personal fault that a
party should bear for the extent of, or the exacerbation of, the injuries
he or she suffered due to personal negligence. This determination may
be termed the "reduction percentage."
(2) In order to render a final monetary apportionment, the trial
judge will initially calculate the "gross recoverable damages" of each
party by multiplying "actual proved damages" by the jury-found "ac-
cident causation percentage" and subtracting the result from "actual
proved damages." The court will then decrease the "gross recoverable
damages" of each party by multiplying that figure by the jury-found
"reduction percentage" for nonuse of seat belts and subtracting the
result from "gross recoverable damages." This final result may be
termed the "net recoverable damages."
(3) However, by a flexible application of equitable duties between
the parties, the court may, in its discretion, adjust the "reduction per-
centage" for nonuse of seat belts and thereby alter a party's "net re-
coverable damages." 69
69. This three step procedure may be demonstrated by the following simple example:
Assume: Party A: "Actual proved damages" = $10,000.
Party B: "Actual proved damages"= $10,000.
Step 1: Jury Determinations:
(a) Party A: "Accident causation percentage" = 40%.
Party B: "Accident causation percentage"= 60%.
(b) Party A: "Reduction percentage" for
nonuse of seat belts = 30%.
Party B: "Reduction percentage" for
nonuse ofseat belts = 10%.
Step 2: Calculate:
(a) Party A: "Gross recoverable damages"= $6,000.
[$10,000-($10,000 X 40%)].
Party B: "Gross recoverable damages"= $4,000.
[$10,000-($10,000 X 60%)].
(b) Party A: "Net recoverable damages"= $4,200.
[$6,000-($6,000 X 30%)].
Party B: "Net recoverable damages"= $3,600.
[$4,000-($4,000 x 10%)].
Step 3: Adjustment of reduction percentage:
In its discretion, the court may increase or decrease a party's "reduction percentage."
Assume the court reduces Party A's "reduction percentage" (jury-found at 30%) to
20%. Thus, Step 2 (b) must be recalculated as follows:
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B. Proof of the Reduction Percentage for Nonuse of Seat Belts
Assuming that the duty to wear seat belts under Washington's com-
parative negligence statute is established, 70 the court should allow in-
troduction of evidence that serves to show the following:
(1) An available seat belt was not worn by, or not worn properly
by, the injured party.
(2) A prudent Washington driver would have worn his or her seat-
belt under the circumstances, and that the failure to take such a safety
precaution amounted to passive negligence under the comparative
negligence statute.
(3) There is a causal connection or relationship between this failure
and the injuries sustained.
In educating the jury by way of instruction, it will be crucial for
counsel to make clear the distinction between the jury's determination
of the "accident causation percentage" and its determination of the
"reduction percentage" (for nonuse of seat belts). This distinction has
been successfully made in other jurisdictions by use of carefully drawn
jury instructions 7' and by submission of a separate verdict form or
separate set of jury interrogatories which carefully limits the jury's
inquiry to the seat belt issue.72
Party A-"Net recoverable damages" = $4,800.
[$6,000-($6,000 x 20%)].
For applications of this procedure in specific factual situations, see section III-E infra.
70. See notes 28-38 and accompanying text supra.
71. See the landmark case of Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d
626, 638 (1967); 1 WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, NEGLIGENCE, Duties of Persons
in Specific Situations 1277 (1966). See also Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc.. 441 F.2d
1344, 1350 (7th Cir. 1971); Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750, 752 n.3 (N.D.
Miss. 1970).
72. Probably the best examples of special verdict forms are found in Wisconsin
cases since that jurisdiction has had the most experience in this area. The Wisconsin
form, excerpted below, could be easily reworded to apply to defendant and plaintiff
alike under Washington's "pure" comparative negligence law.
Special Verdict
Question 1: On (date) at the time of the collision in question, was the plaintiff
Guest negligent in failing to guard herself against injury by not wearing the seat
belt which was provided for her use?
Answer:
Question 2: If you answered question 1, "yes," then answer this question:
Was such negligence on the part of plaintiff Guest in failing to wear her seat
belt a cause of her injury?
Answer:
Question 3: Was the conceded negligence on the part of Defendant A and
Defendant B in causing the collision a cause of the plaintiff Guest's injury?
Answer:
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C. Causal Connection Between Injury and Nonuse of Seat Belts
Establishing that the nonuse of seat belts in fact contributed to or
increased the injuries suffered presents a most difficult and critical
task. Recent decisions have held that there is no presumption that
nonuse of seat belts caused or aggravated a party's injuries.7 3 Conse-
quently, competent expert or other testimony must be submitted7 4
which will establish that the injuries of a party would have been re-
duced or minimized if seat belts had been used, or were caused or ag-
gravated by the failure to use a seat belt.75 In the absence of any proof
of causation, the trial court should properly refuse the proferred in-
structions or special verdict on the question of negligent nonuse of
seat belts.7 6 Moreover, a quantum of causation proof and of adequate
Question 4: If you find by your answers to questions 1 and 2, that plaintiff
Guest was negligent in failing to wear her seat belt and that such negligence
was a cause of her injury; and if you have found, by your answer to question 3,
that the conceded negligence on the part of the defendants also caused her injury,
then answer this question:
Taking all of the negligence that may have caused the injury to plaintiff
Guest as 100%, what percentage of this negligence is attributable to:
(a) Plaintiff Guest? Answer:
(b) The Defendants A and B? Answer:
Total: 100%
C. R. HEFT & C. J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL, App. III, Form 21, at
54-55 (1971). See also Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968).
It is observed that special verdicts appear to be the favored method for determining
the apportionment of damages under Washington's comparative negligence law. See
Note, supra note 1, at 713-15; Henry, supra note 67, at 13. Jury apportionment
has also appeared to work successfully in other jurisdictions utilizing comparative
negligence formulations. See Henry, supra note 67, at 15, 17; Grubb & Roper, supra
note 67 at 242-43; Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligenee: Wisconsin's Answer, 55
A.B.A.J. 127 (1969); Oliver, Let Us All be Frank about Comparative Negligence, 28
L.A.B. BULL. 119, 142-43 (1953); Note, Negligence-Mississippi's Comparative
Negligence Statute-Wisconsin Statute Compared, 20 Miss. LJ. 99, 101 (1948);
Note, Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania? 17 TEMPLE L.Q. 276, 284 (1943).
73. See Toperoff v. Mor, (unreported decision of Judge Dean, Q.C., at Newcastle
upon Tyne, Nov. 1972), commented on in Kerse, Some Recent Decisions on Wearing
Seat Belts, 117 SoLicIToPs'J. 625 (1973).
74. This necessity will perforce develop a pool of medical experts for utilization
by the trial bar. This need is clearly not insuperable, as evidenced by numerous other
litigation-spawned groups of experts, and more notably by the present existence of
such persons in the greater Puget Sound medical community. See Address by Dr.
Peter Fisher, Ass't Clinical Professor of Medicine, Univ. of Wash., to Seattle
Kiwanis Club, in Seattle, Mar. 7, 1972, reported in Dieffenbach, Doctor calls air
bags in automobiles safety hoax, Seattle Times, Mar. 9, 1972, at § D, p.16 , col. 1.
75. See Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 641 (1967).
76. Id. A fortiori, the reverse of the above causal relationship should justify an
increase in the gross recoverable damages by a party; i.e., if one establishes that the
use of available seat belts substantially caused or contributed to the injuries of a
party, recovery should be allowed as part of one's general or specific damages.
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expert opinion are requisite to establish the exact reduction percentage
for nonuse of seat belts. In the cases surveyed, this reduction percent-
age has been calculated to be from 5 to 33 percent of a party's re-
coverable damages.77 Clearly the calculation should not be left to jury
speculation alone.
D. A Iteration of Reduction Percentage for Nonuse of Seat Belts
As mentioned above, the third proposed step in applying the seat
belt rule is the trial court's determination of each party's recoverable
damages. 78 The simplest application of this procedure will obtain in
the situation involving two drivers, neither of whom was wearing seat
belts at the time of collision.79 Equitable fault apportionment becomes
more difficult, however, when a guest-passenger sues a host-driver8 °
since there may be a cognizable, equitable duty to promote seat belt
usage, owed by the driver to his passenger. 81 Upon finding that a
host-driver failed in some respect to fulfill this duty a trial judge could
mitigate the reduction percentage for passenger nonuse of seat belts
found by the jury.
In the recent case of Pasternack v. Poulton,82 the High Court of
London applied this novel "mitigation" approach in a host-guest situ-
ation. The plaintiff, a front seat passenger in defendant's car, suffered
facial injuries in a collision caused solely by the defendant's negli-
gence. Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt and did not know one was
77. See, e.g., Pasternack v. Poulton, [ 1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.) (5% reduction);
Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (5% reduction); O'Con-
nell v. Jackson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A. 1971) (15% reduction); Purnell v. Shields
(unreported decision) (20% reduction), commented on in Kerse, supra note 73, at 626;
Toperoff v. Mor (unreported decision of Judge Dean, Q.C., at Newcastle upon Tyne,
Nov. 1972) (25% reduction), commented on in Kerse, supra note 73; McGee v.
Francis Shaw & Co. (unreported H.C., Manchester, decision) (33.3% reduction), com-
mented on in Kerse, supra note 73, at 626.
78. See sections 11I-B supra & III-E infra.
79. See Example 1, section III-E infra.
80. It is noted that the Washington State Legislature repealed the "host-guest"
statute, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 46.08.080-.086, during the 1974 session. Ch. 3, [1974]
Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. (effective July 24, 1974).
81. A British commentator has concluded that recent cases in England indicate
that drivers of motor vehicles owe a number of affirmative duties toward their guest
passengers: the duty to drive safely; the duty to take steps to see that available belts
are worn; the duty to encourage by his own example; the duty to point out the seat
belts' existence in the car; and, where necessary, the duty to give assistance or instruc-
tion for their use. See Kerse, supra note 73, at 627; note 48 supra.
82. [ 1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.).
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available, although she was familiar with seat belts generally and had
worn them on other occasions. The defendant driver had not worn a
belt himself and failed to either point out the existence of belts or en-
courage his passenger to use her own. The Court held that the plain-
tiff passenger was guilty of contributory negligence for failure to wear
her seat belt,83 and that the defendant driver was negligent toward his
passenger for failure to encourage seat belt use.84 In apportioning the
damages between the parties, the Court further held that the propor-
tion of blame to be borne by the plaintiff for her injuries should be a
mere 5 percent. In contrast, other British tribunals have held that a
party's damages should be reduced from 15 to 30 percent for failure
to use seat belts.85
It should also be apparent that a passenger may owe a duty to the
driver to maintain a cautious lookout, to sound a warning of immi-
nent or hidden dangers8 6 or to instruct the driver in the proper opera-
tion of the vehicle.87 Although Washington trial courts may hesitate to
follow the British jurists in weighing these equitable factors directly
against the jury-determined reduction percentage for nonuse of seat
83. Id. at 482.
84. Id. at 482-83.
85. See note 77 supra. In Toperoff v. Mor, (unreported decision of Judge Dean,
Q.C., at Newcastle upon Tyne, Nov. 1972), commented on in Kerse, supra note 73,
the plaintiff passenger had been asked to wear his seat belt and had done so at the
commencement of the journey. After a brief stop, however, the plaintiff neglected to
rebuckle his belt; the defendant driver had used his belt at all times and was not
seriously injured. Held: The plaintiff's failure to use his belt, in view of the defendant's
example and encouragement, must be considered more than a mere act of inadvertence
for which he could be excused; his recoverable damages were reduced by 25%.
In McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., (unreported H.C., Manchester, decision), com-
mented on in Kerse, supra note 73, at 626, the plaintiff passenger was not wearing a
seat belt at the time of the accident, although the subject of wearing a belt had been
mentioned to him and he had obviously elected not to wear one. The defendant was
wearing his belt and was not injured. Upon establishing that a causal connection
existed between the plaintiff's injuries and his nonuse of the belt, Held: Plaintiff's re-
coverable damages were to be reduced by 33%. See note 77 and accompanying text
supra.
86. See note 77 and accompanying text supra. These duties were sought to be
imposed in Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971), where
plaintiff's decedent, a passenger, was alleged to have failed to warn his partner-
driver of impending danger from defendants' vehicles.
87. This purported duty might well arise in a situation involving an owner-host
who is the passenger in his vehicle operated by a friend who seeks to "try out" the
car. The more likely situation would involve the professional or nonprofessional
driving instructor who fails to set a proper example or neglects to teach his pupil
basic safety measures. See, e.g., Nettleship v. Weston, [1971] 2 Q.B. 691 (C.A.),
where the learner-driver and the experienced, but not professional, passenger-in-
structor were held to be jointly liable for the injuries each suffered (damages were
divided equally). Id. at 703.
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belts, under Washington's comparative negligence law it would be
reasonable and proper for them to do so. However, a reluctant trial
judge might instead choose to employ the special verdict form in the
host-guest situation, as is done in Wisconsin. 88
E. Application of Seat Belt Rule to Specific Factual Situations89
The operation of the proposed seat belt rule is made clearer by the
following factual examples. 90 Example 1. Party A (plaintiff or de-
fendant) and Party B (plaintiff or defendant) collide; both are driving
and neither is wearing a seat belt. Actual proved damages of A and B
are $10,000 each. The jury finds Party A to be 30 percent actively
negligent and Party B to be 70 percent actively negligent in causing
the accident. Party A's gross recoverable damages are therefore
$7,000; B's are $3,000.
The jury also finds that Party A, through nonuse of a seat belt, was
25 percent at fault, or passively negligent, for his own injuries; Party
B is found to be only 20 percent at fault for his own injuries due to his
nonuse of a seat belt. Party A's net recoverable damages are then
computed by the trial judge by multiplying the reduction percentage
for nonuse of a seat belt by A's gross recoverable damages and sub-
tracting the result from the gross amount, to arrive at A's net recovery
of $5,250 ($7,000 X .25 = $1,750; $7,000 - $1,750 = $5,250).
Party B's net recovery, computed in the same manner, amounts to
$2,400.
Example 2. Assume the same situation as in Example 1, except that
88. The Washington statute itself gives little or no guidance as to the role of the
trial judge in making such determinations, nor does the language authorize the broad
use of the Wisconsin special verdict procedure in doing so. However, it has been per-
suasively argued that use of special verdicts is easily accomplished under Washington
court rules, and is probably the better procedure to be utilized because more of the
specific factual determinations can be made by the jury, thus "controlling the jury"
and restraining unreasonable exercises of discretion by guiding the trial bench. See
Note, supra note 1, at 714.
Alternatively, the trial judge may merely instruct the jury on all of the additional
factors mentioned above, prepatory to its determination of the reduction percentage
for seat belt nonuse. See note 72 supra.
89. Reference should also be made to the factual situations set forth in Note,
supra note 1, at 711-12, which exemplify the specific operation of the pure compara-
tive negligence law in determining the gross recoverable amount of damages for each
party. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
90. See the example pertaining to personal injury coverage under automobile con-
tracts of insurance, note 56 and accompanying text supra.
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the trial judge admits the following evidence: Party A was doing a
favor for Party B by helping him drive B's second car to a friend's
home, and Party A was not familiar with Party B's foreign car, nor
did B take time to explain its safe operation or how to use the compli-
cated seat belt apparatus. Party A, however, was familiar with seat
belts generally and had used them consistently in his own car.
After receiving the jury verdict based on the above facts, the trial
judge in his discretion decides to lower the reduction percentage to
only 15 percent rather than the 25 percent found by the jury against
Party A for his passive negligence. Thus, Party A's net recoverable
damages are $5,950.91
Example 3. Party A is a passenger in Party B's vehicle which col-
lides with a tree. Party A sustains actual proved damages of $10,000
and Party B sustains only minor injuries. Party A wore no seat belt,
despite Party B's insistence that he do so; Party B wore a seat belt.
The jury finds Party B solely negligent for the accident, but also
finds that 50 percent of Party A's injuries were due to his passive neg-
ligence in not using a seat belt. The judge reduces Party A's recovery
by the reduction percentage of 50 percent, netting A $5,000.
Example 4. Assume the same situation as in Example 3, with these
additional facts: Party B does not wear a seat belt and sustains
$10,000 in damages; Party B did not indicate to Party A that seat
belts were available, nor did B urge A to wear them.
As in Example 3, the jury finds Party B solely negligent for the
accident, but also finds that 50 percent of Party A's injuries were due
to A's failure to wear a seat belt. The judge, however, diminishes the
reduction percentage for nonuse of seat belts to 10 percent because of
Party B's passively negligent omissions. Party A's gross recoverable
damages are thereby reduced by only 10 percent and A recovers
$9,000 from Party B; B can recover only from his insurance com-
pany, should B's policy permit him to do so.
Example 5. Party A is a passenger in Party B's vehicle, which col-
lides with Party C's vehicle. Party A wears no seat belt, although re-
quested to do so by Party B; B wore a seat belt at all times; and Party
C wore no seat belt. Party A also saw Party C's vehicle and recog-
91. The computations are as follows: $7,000 X .15 = $1,050; $7,000-$1,050 =
$5,950. The court may in its discretion decrease the jury's reduction percentage for
nonuse of seat belts. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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nized the imminent danger from C's actions, but said nothing to his
driver, Party B.
Party A sustains $15,000 in actual proved damages; Party B sus-
tains only minor injuries; and Party C sustains $10,000 in actual
proved damages. The jury finds that Party A was 20 percent passively
negligent for failure to warn Party B of impending danger. Both
Party B and Party C are charged with 40 percent active negligence
for the accident. The gross recoverable damages for the parties under
pure comparative negligence would be: Party A-$12,000; Party
B-0; Party C-$6,000.
The jury also finds that Party A's injuries would have been reduced
by 60 percent had Party A worn a seat belt; and Party C's injuries
would only have been reduced by 20 percent had Party C worn a seat
belt. Thus the reduction percentage for the passive negligence attri-
butable to nonuse of seat belts is 60 percent for A and 20 percent for C.
Applying these reductions, the trial court awards net recoverable
damages of $4,800 to Party A and $4,800 to Party C.92 Since there is
no right to contribution between joint tort feasors, 93 and since a party
guilty of active negligence cannot collect from a party guilty of pas-
sive negligence, 94 Party A may proceed against Parties B and C jointly
and severally to recover $4,800. Party C, however, must seek a
$4,800 recovery from Party B alone.95
IV. CONCLUSION
The plethora of statistical information and authoritative studies
presently available inexorably substantiates the effectiveness of seat
belts in reducing the number of injuries and deaths, and their at-
tendant rising social and economic costs, caused by motor vehicle ac-
cidents. While our legal system has dealt laboriously with the seat belt
92. The computations are as follows: Party A-$12,000 damages X .60 = $7,200;
$12,000-$7,200 = $4,800 net recoverable damages. Party C-S6,000 damages X .20
$1,200; $6,000-$1,200 = $4,800 net recoverable damages.
93. This is the law in a majority of jurisdictions. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
305-10 (4th ed. 1971).
94. See Reefer Queen Co. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 73 Wn. 2d 783,
440 P.2d 453 (1968).
95. This result has been criticized as unduly burdensome under comparative
negligence theory. See Note, supra note 1, at 727; cf. Reefer Queen Co. v. Marine
Construction & Design Co., 73 Wn. 2d 783, 440 P.2d 453 (1968); Rufener v. Scott.
46Wn. 2d 240, 280 P.2d 253 (1955).
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under antiquated ideas of contributory fault, the adoption of compar-
ative negligence laws has led to a new era of conceptualization. Under
comparative negligence laws, recovery of that portion of one's injuries
which results from failing to take the reasonable, prudent precaution
of fastening one's seat belt can no longer be justified.
While some initial procedural difficulty and confusion is to be an-
ticipated, this ephemeral throe will subside with the establishment of
the seat belt rule. Application of the rule will require each individual
to bear the responsibility for injuries which result from one's own neg-
ligence and will precipitate the most equitable apportionment of
damages achievable under modem systems of civil or comparative
law.
